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Observers accredited by the CENI during the 2018 DRC elections. Photo
credit: Alain Likota, MONUSCO (Bukavu). Source: Flickr.
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is currently undergoing a
post-electoral political transition that will have a decisive impact on its
near political future. For the  rst time in history, we are witnessing a
peaceful transition from one president to another. Despite the multiple
 aws in the electoral process, the elections held in December 2018
enticed widespread hopes among the Congolese population that a true
shift of power can be an outcome of such process. Half a year later
however, much of this popular optimism has waned and doubts are
being raised as to whether this transition will in fact lead to a
substantial change in the daily lives of the Congolese. Current dynamics
suggest a deepening political crisis and uncertainty and will have a
major impact on existing political stability and security conditions,
despite the appointment of a new government at the end of July 2019.
Two major issues undermine the new President Tshisekedi’s legitimacy.
One is the credibility of the o cial December 2018 election results,
which have been subject to heated debates. The election results have
been widely read as not representing the popular vote because of
numerous irregularities. In response, concerns about the legitimacy of
the results were expressed by international, bilateral and multilateral
partners, as well as a signi cant amount of the Congolese population
who overwhelmingly voted for the opposition candidate Martin Fayulu.
The second issue is the widespread speculation about a ‘power-sharing
deal’ between former President Kabila and the new President
Tshisekedi that was created in order to protect Kabila’s interests after
leaving o ce. The July agreement on a new government between the
Tshisekedi’s and Kabila’s political camps is in spirit of this deal.
Strikingly, with the exception of a number of protests following
immediately after the proclamation of the results, a massive popular
rejection so far has remained absent. Indeed, despite the o cial
outcome, the elections raised a lot of hope among the millions of
Congolese who were expecting that a change of regime would create
the necessary conditions for an improvement of their living conditions
and would, in the end, gradually lead to democracy. It explains why,
despite the Kabila-Tshisekedi deal, many remained optimistic about the
possibility of real change.
Most Congolese are convinced that Felix Tshisekedi is aware of his
electoral illegitimacy and thus would do everything possible to gain
popular support through an increased investment in good governance
and development. His  rst 100 days in o ce were largely welcomed as
an announcement of real change and proof of his commitment to
respond to the social concerns of the population, such as the payment
of salaries, the reduction of school fees, the rehabilitation of roads and
public services, etc. The political legacy of his father and major
opposition leader under Mobutu, Étienne Tshisekedi, further helped him
to gain popular legitimacy.
Half a year after his inauguration, however, the signals are no longer
positive. While President Tshisekedi spends a good deal of his time
abroad attempting to consolidate his legitimacy through support from
regional and international partners, at home, Congo is moving towards a
deepening political crisis. The new president is faced with a constant
challenge to limit Kabila’s political power and does not many options
besides ‘co-leading’ the country. The agreement on a new government
has proved to be subject to a sensitive power-sharing exercise and is
being dominated by members of Kabila’s political camp, which has won
a majority of seats in the National Assembly, Senate, Provincial
Assemblies and has a majority of newly elected Provincial Governors.
This leaves little room for Tshisekedi to manoeuvre. Kabila is also
keeping a  rm control over the economy and security services.
Tshisekedi’s attempts to increase his political space are adding to
existing tensions between both political families and may eventually
lead to an unprecedented crisis and a point of no-return that could end
in new rounds of violence.
Two recent issues illustrate current dynamics. The  rst is the meddling
by the Constitutional Court. Thirty-three national members of
parliament, including 23 opposition members have been disquali ed by
the Court (of which 6 out of 9 judges were nominated during Kabila’s
presidency). Most of the disquali ed members of parliament have been
replaced by members of Kabila’s political camp, which supports the
assumption that the old regime is keeping a  rm grip on political rule in
the DRC. The cycle of validation, invalidation and revalidation of
parliamentarians by the Constitutional Court witnessed in June further
adds to the growing mistrust in the court and contributes to a loss of
legitimacy towards state institutions in general.
Another example is the Presidential appointment of state agents of the
National Society of Railways of Congo (SNCC) and the State owned
mining company, Gécamines. The Kabila camp claims that these
appointments are a violation of the constitution, as they were not to be
signed in the absence of a new government.
These and other issues have a major impact on existing political
tensions and further contribute to a rising uncertainty and mistrust both
between political elites and within the Congolese population. It also
contributes to political speech inspired by identity narratives, which
revive aspirations of political autonomy in Katanga, Bas-Congo, and
other provinces. These aspirations express a quest to assume public
authority over key resources and populations and promote development
‘from below’ but also express a wish to move away from Kinshasa,
which is considered as being the cause of a lack of progress. The
absence of a  rm response and discourse that advocates Congolese
unity is only illustrating the current state of affairs.
Many fear that in order to politically survive, President Tshisekedi will
have no choice but to end the existing power sharing agreement and
organise a counter-strategy limiting former President Kabila’s political
control. In the event of such a cessation, the consequences risk
producing the conditions for an unprecedented political crisis.Today,
the fear of such a rupture is palpable. The schism growing within
Kabila’s camp as a result of the disagreement between former
President Kabila and Modeste Lukwebo about the latter’s decision to
run for President of the Senate- opposing Alexis Thambwe Mwamba,
Kabila’s preferred candidate- is only contributing to these fears.
The initial optimism of political stability held amongst the Congolese
and the international community today has largely waned. Current
dynamics leave us with no other option than to keep a close eye on
Congo’s immediate political future. While the agreement concluded
between Tshisekedi and Kabila could be read as a step towards some
form of stability based on the sharing of power, in the long run, it risks
further reducing Tshisekedi’s popular support and key ingredient of his
power base.
Note: The CRP blogs gives the views of the author, not the position of
the Con ict Research Programme, the London School of Economics
and Political Science, or the UK Government.
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